



Cybersecurity

User authentication

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


Most crucial building block

- User authentication lies at the heart of virtually any secure system
- Provides the basis for (but it is distinct from)
 - Access control
 - Accountability
 - Traceability
- Two **distinct** functions
 - identification
 - verification



NISR model for user authentication






Authentication means

- **Something you know**
 - ID, PIN, passwords, answers to questions
- **Something you have**
 - memory card, smart card, token, electronic keycards
- **Something you are**
 - biometrics
- **Something you do**
 - behavioural biometrics (signatures, gestures)
- **Multifactor authentication**




Password-based authentication

- Systems maintain an ID-password file
- Only password hashes are stored




Attacks against password systems

- **Offline dictionary attack**
- If the password file is hacked (always possible) passwords are at risk
- Attack starts with more likely (weak) passwords




Randomized hashes

- **Use of password and salt values to compute hashes**
 - Used by UNIX



Password storage



Verification



Randomized hashes

- **Randomization serves three purposes**
 - It prevents duplicate passwords from being recognized
 - It greatly increases the complexity of dictionary attacks
 - It becomes nearly impossible to detect if a person has used the same password on multiple systems



Attacks against password systems

- **Rainbow tables**
 - By using 1.4 GB of data, 99.9% of Windows password hashes were guessed in 13.8 seconds
- **Exploit tendency towards short and easy password**
 - Try user's name, initials, account name, under several permutations
 - Try words from various dictionaries.
 - Try permutations on the words from previous step.
 - Try various capitalization permutations
- **40% of passwords (UNIX) guessed in < 1 hour**



Attacks against password systems

- **Attacks targeting a specific user**
 - The attacker targets a specific account and submits password guesses until the correct password is discovered.
 - Use of lockout to avoid it
- **Use of popular passwords**
- **Users errors**
- **Multiple password use**
- **New trend: build statistical or data driven models of users' generate passwords**



Defenses: prevent access to password file

- **Separate ID file and file with password hashes**
- Useful and good, but we can not rely on this kind of protection only
 - Unexpected software vulnerabilities
 - Multiple use of the same passwords
 - Physical attacks: emergency disks, back-ups, boot with different operating systems ...
 - Password sniffing



Defenses: password selection strategies

- User education
 - many ignore recommendations
 - many are not capable to judge
 - an easy to remember trick (initial letters of sentence)
- Computer-generated password
 - Difficult to memorize, not accepted
- Reactive password checking
 - Expensive
- Proactive password checker
 - Tradeoff between complexity and acceptance



Rule enforcement

- NIST SP 800-63-2 suggests the following rules:
 - Password must have at least sixteen characters (basic16)
 - Password must have at least eight characters including an uppercase and lowercase letter, a symbol, and a digit. It may not contain a dictionary word (comprehensive8).
- Password checker
 - Build a dictionary with bad passwords and check that password chosen by the users are not contained in it
 - Time and space complexity




Rule enforcement with Bloom filter

- For each password apply K hash functions: $H_1(x) \dots H_k(x)$
- Initialize a hash table with N entries ($H(x) \in [0, N-1]$)
- If $H_j(x_i) = m$ for any i, j , let $T(m) = 1$

$h_1(\text{"oracle"}) = 1$
 $h_2(\text{"oracle"}) = 4$
 $h_3(\text{"oracle"}) = 5$

$h_1(\text{"database"}) = 2$
 $h_2(\text{"database"}) = 5$
 $h_3(\text{"database"}) = 10$

$h_1(\text{"filter"}) = 4$
 $h_2(\text{"filter"}) = 7$
 $h_3(\text{"filter"}) = 10$






Rule enforcement with Bloom filter

- If user chooses a password y such that $T(H_i(y)) = 1$ for all i , then password is rejected
- False rejections are possible
 - tradeoff between complexity and false alarm probability



Rule enforcement with Bloom filter





Token-based authentication

- **Memory cards**
 - Can store but not process data
 - Bank cards, hotel room keys
 - Often used in conjunction with passwd
- **Smart tokens (cards)**
 - Can store and process data



Smart tokens classification

- **Physical characteristic**
 - Smart tokens include an embedded microprocessor. A smart token that looks like a bank card is called a smart card. Other smart tokens can look like calculators, keys, or other small portable objects
- **User interface**
 - Keypad, display, buttons
- **Electronic interface**
 - contact, contactless
- **Authentication protocol**



Authentication protocols

- **Static**
 - With a static protocol, the user authenticates himself or herself to the token then the token authenticates the user to the computer.
- **Dynamic password generation**
 - Once common for internet banking
- **Challenge response**
 - the computer system generates a challenge and the smart token generates a response based on the challenge. Example: pubkey crypto



Biometric authentication

- **Based on a biometric trait of the user**
- **The biometric trait must be**
 - Universal
 - Unique (discriminating power)
 - Permanent (space, time, age ...)
 - Difficult to spoof
 - Easy to measure (non intrusive)
 - Cheap
 - Non-sensitive




Common (and less common) traits

- Face, facial characteristics
- Fingerprints
- Iris
- Retinal pattern
- Hand, ear, foot geometry
- Veins
- ECG, EEG
- Voice
- Signature
- Gait
-




Common (and less common) traits




Enrollment phase

- Enrollment may or may not require physical presence of an enrolling agent
- Single or multiple acquisitions to cope with lack of stability




Verification

- A verification protocol verifies that the user is who he/she claims to be
- Most common situation



Identification


- An identification protocol must decide if the user is among the enrolled users, OR it identifies who the user is
- Collisions are more problematic than for verification





Dealing with errors


- The inexact nature of the acquisition and matching processes causes **unavoidable** errors
- Two types of errors possible: **false positive and false negative**





Dealing with errors



If the distributions of the match-score under the two hypothesis is known the tradeoff between FPR and FNR can be measured exactly: OC curve





Dealing with errors

- Scatterplots and empirical OC curves may help when an exact statistical model is not available
- Operating point is determined by looking at the OC curve






Remote authentication

- When authentication is carried out remotely additional threats must be faced with
 - eavesdropping
 - replay attack
- Solutions based on challenge response protocol possibly coupled with cryptography




Password-based C-R protocol



- Neither the password nor the hash of the password are transmitted in plain
- h is a hash function
- f is such that $h(P)$ can not be recovered by observing $f(r, h(P))$




Token-based C-R protocol



- Password P' is only used by the user to access the token
- In a static system W' is stored in the token
- In a dynamic system W' is generated on the fly by the token and the host




Biometric-based C-R protocol (static)



- $E()$ is an encryption function
- BT' is a biometric template captured by a device at client's side
- D' identifies the biometric device
- $BT' = BT(U)$ means match is above verification threshold



Biometric-based C-R protocol (dynamic)



- The biometric template is also generated based on a challenge
- For instance the user may be asked to type or utter some letters



Summary of attacks

Attacks	Authenticators	Examples	Typical Defenses
Client attack	Password	Guessing, exhaustive search	Large entropy; limited attempts
	Token	Exhaustive search	Large entropy; limited attempts; theft of object requires presence
	Biometric	False match	Large entropy; limited attempts
Host attack	Password	Plaintext theft, dictionary/exhaustive search	Hashing; large entropy; protection of password database
	Token	Passcode theft	Same as password; 1-time passcode
	Biometric	Template theft	Capture device authentication; challenge response



Summary of attacks

Eavesdropping, theft, and copying	Password	“Shoulder surfing”	User diligence to keep secret; administrator diligence to quickly revoke compromised passwords; multifactor authentication
	Token	Theft, counterfeiting hardware	Multifactor authentication; tamper resistant/evident token
	Biometric	Copying (spoofing) biometric	Copy detection at capture device and capture device authentication
Replay	Password	Replay stolen password response	Challenge-response protocol
	Token	Replay stolen passcode response	Challenge-response protocol; 1-time passcode
	Biometric	Replay stolen biometric template response	Copy detection at capture device and capture device authentication via challenge-response protocol



References

- W. Stallings, L. Brown, “*Computer security: principles and practices*”, Pearson, 4-th edition. Chapter 3.
- Lectures notes (these slides)